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ABSTRACT: Capabilities to inform, influence, and persuade
are necessary both for national security success and as a costeffective toolset relative to physical military power. This article
discusses shortfalls and deficiencies in this area, and concludes with
recommendations to increase resources for manning and tools for
informing, influencing, and persuading, as well as efforts to inculcate
“communication mindedness” in commanders and senior leaders.

A

sking for a second helping when everyone else is tightening
their belts is awkward. Unfortunately, proponents for US
government capabilities to inform, influence, and persuade are
in just that position, as such capabilities have not yet fully matured nor are
demands for their use fully satisfied. While a time of “belt-tightening” is
undeniably upon us, we must find a way to support continued growth,
development, and improvement in this area.

Informing, Influencing, and Persuading

How US government representatives present and describe themselves to and engage and communicate with foreign audiences matters.
The success of many policies is contingent on the support received from
various populations whose perceptions are influenced by both what we
do and what we say, which is particularly relevant for national security
policy—for example, one of the greatest national security threats of our
time is transnational terrorism and other forms of violent extremism.
Efforts to combat violent extremism must consider the beliefs, motives,
perceptions, and grievances that predicate extremism as well as those
that lead to support for violence.1 National security objectives are not
necessarily well served when US forces kill or capture the members of
a terrorist network if the perceptions and beliefs that motivated the
terrorists and their supporters remain to generate a similar network in
its place.2
Similarly, US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have
starkly exposed the truth that some military objectives depend in large
part on the behavior and attitudes of relevant civilian populations and
cannot be achieved solely through the application of force.3 As the
1     See Christopher Paul and Elizabeth L. Petrun Sayers, “Assessing Against and Moving Past
the ‘Funnel Model’ of Counterterrorism Communication,” Defence Strategic Communication 1, no. 1
(Winter 2015): 27–41.
2     As then-Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates noted, “Over the long term, we cannot kill
and capture our way to victory” over “terrorist networks and other extremists.” See Robert M. Gates
U.S. Global Leadership Campaign (speech, Washington, DC, July 15, 2008), http://archive.defense
.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1262.
3     For a contemporary example, see the observation that “the application of military force alone
is not likely to defeat ISIS.” in David S. Sorenson, “Priming Strategic Communications: Countering
the Appeal of ISIS,” Parameters 44, no. 3 (Autumn 2014): 25–36.
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Department of Defense Strategic Communication Science and Technolog y Plan noted:
“a compelling argument can be made today that the public perceptions
and implications of military operations might increasingly outweigh the
tangible benefits actually achieved from real combat on the battlefield.”4
Informing, influencing, and persuading go beyond traditional
messaging to include a much wider range of capabilities that need to
be coordinated because actions communicate.5 Whether you think of
it as minimizing the “say-do gap,” or wish to discuss the “diplomacy of
deeds,” what we do matters at least as much if not more than what we say,
which is especially important for deployed military forces.6 Every action,
utterance, message, image, and movement of a nation’s military forces
influences the perceptions and opinions of the populations who witness
them—both first hand in the area of operations and second or third
hand elsewhere in the world.7 The White House National Framework for
Strategic Communication got it exactly right: “Every action that the United
States Government takes sends a message.”8
If informing, influencing, and persuading are important, the United
States needs not only the capabilities dedicated to communication and
messaging, but also the means to coordinate policies, actions, and other
sources of messages and signals to achieve desired objectives.9

Informing, Influencing, and Persuading Are Cost Effective

Compared with other elements of national power, efforts to inform,
influence, and persuade are relatively inexpensive and generally lowcost synergistic multipliers for applying other forms of power. There
are two arguments to be made here: the preventative argument where
informing, influencing, and persuading efforts help avoid the need for
deploying more expensive capabilities because an ounce of prevention is
worth a pound of cure and the enabling argument where the combined
arms application of information power along with other forms of power
makes it easier, and thus less expensive, to accomplish missions.
Considering the first argument, imagine the savings that accrue when
American efforts to inform, influence, and persuade are so successful
preceding a prospective military operation (during phase 0, shape, in the
six-phase joint operation construct) that the planned operation becomes
unnecessary.10 The costs of successful efforts to diminish support for
violent extremism are reduced when the costs involved in hunting and
4     Defense Research and Engineering, Rapid Reaction Technology Office, Strategic Communication
Science and Technology Plan: Current Activities, Capability Gaps and Areas for Further Investment (Washington,
DC: Department of Defense [DoD], April 2009), 2.
5     See Christopher Paul, “ ‘Strategic Communication’ is Vague: Say What You Mean,” Joint Force
Quarterly 56 (1st Quarter 2010): 10–13.
6     Defense Science Board, Task Force on Strategic Communication (Washington, DC: Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, January 2008), 13; and
Bruce Gregory, “Public Diplomacy and National Security: Lessons from the U.S. Experience,” Small
Wars Journal (August 14, 2008): 6.
7     Todd C. Helmus, Christopher Paul, and Russell W. Glenn, Enlisting Madison Avenue: The
Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operation (Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2007), 171.
8     White House, National Framework for Strategic Communication (Washington, DC: White House,
March 16, 2010), 3.
9     DoD, Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment (Washington, DC: DoD, June 2016).
10     US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Operations Planning, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington,
DC: JCS, August 11, 2011).
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eliminating terrorists, including the human cost exacted by the terrorists
and possibly lost to collateral damage, are not expended. Following the
same logic, even if prevention is not possible, efforts to inform, influence, and persuade can modestly decrease the costs of, or threats to,
other efforts by making an operating environment more permissive and
conducive to desired end states before operations begin.
In addition to shaping the battlespace or preventing the need
for full-fledged operations, a second argument insists the synergies
from informing, influencing, and persuading alongside other military
capabilities can reduce costs. Some operations require the support
of indigenous constituencies in order to succeed and winning that
support strictly through physical force and without employing influence
capabilities is impossible or at least extremely costly. Occurring more
often than we would like to think, this situation is one of the main
drivers behind winning all the battles but losing the war.11
While easily imagined, making concrete cost-benefit calculations in
support of either of these arguments and generating evidence for them is
much harder.12 Measuring the impact of efforts to inform, influence, and
persuade remains a notable challenge, and counterfactuals (where something did not happen) are even harder to document rigorously.13 Other
research has used notional data to illustrate the possible cost savings
from influence operations during military activities under a number of
different scenarios and assumptions. The conclusion was the increased
use of information operations in phase 0, phase 1, and phase 2 “should
be worth the investment to avoid or delay the significantly higher costs
of the remaining phases,” where the application of conventional forces
costs orders of magnitude more than information operations.14
Firmly quantified or not, successful prophylactic action will be
undeniably cheaper than resolving a contingency through deploying
significant forces. Likewise, military operations or other forms of
expense that are made easier or shorter when preceded or accompanied
by effective influence will always yield savings, as inform, influence, and
persuade activities are inexpensive relative to the costs associated with
longer (or bloodier) operations.

Improving US Capabilities to Inform, Influence, and Persuade

The past decade has seen a host of white papers, reports, articles, and
commentaries suggesting reforms and improvements for US strategic
communication and public diplomacy, two prominent categories of US
efforts to inform, influence, and persuade. The ideas, conclusions, and
recommendations of 36 of these reports were surveyed and compared
in a 2009 RAND study, which found the documents often recommend
11     Gina Cairns-McFeeters, John Shapiro, Steve Nettleton, Sonya Finley, and Daryk Zirkle,
“Winning the Ground Battles but Losing the Information War,” Small Wars Journal (January 21,
2010).
12     On the difficulty of assessment and measurement in this area, see Amy Zalman, “Getting
the Information Albatross off Our Back: Notes toward an Information-Savvy National Security
Community,” Perspectives 6, no. 2 (April 2014).
13     Christopher Paul, Jessica Yeats, Colin P. Clarke, and Miriam Matthews, Assessing and Evaluating
Department of Defense Efforts to Inform, Influence, and Persuade: Desk Reference (Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2015).
14     Mark A. Ochoa, “Conventional Operations Must Be Less Expensive than Information
Operations,” IO Sphere (June 2011), 43.
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very different things with no universal consensus and at least four
commonly repeated themes:
Demand for Increased Resources. The strategic communication
reports showed strong consensus that capabilities to inform, influence,
and persuade are under resourced. The call for more resources was the
single most frequent recommendation, appearing in more than half of
the 36 reports reviewed.15 Agencies and departments broadly agreed
on the need for both increased personnel and for more programmatic
resources. This call for resources must be echoed and should emphasize
both force structure and tools.
Leadership. Roughly one quarter of the 36 strategic communication and public diplomacy documents reviewed make an explicit call for
leadership, which referred to at least four different things: 1) presidential
attention (a desire of proponents in any issue area), 2) authority, 3) good
choices (bad policies cannot be well communicated), and 4) clear direction. Distilling and synthesizing from these previous recommendations,
leaders across the government should pay more attention to communication, to influence, and to the effects that actions and policies have or
require in or through the information environment.
A Clear Definition of Overall Strategy. Often related to calls for
leadership, almost one-third of the strategic communication reports
reviewed make a call for clear strategic direction. According to one
commentator, without a clear strategy, “the leaders of each department,
agency and office are left to decide what is important.”16 Most of the
sources recommending clear strategy call for highest-level strategy, a
clear foreign policy strategy that efforts to inform, influence, and persuade can support, as well as strategy that goes beyond a communication
strategy. Unfortunately, critics have pointed out that the United States is
often poor at strategy.17
While strategy may be hard, goals, at least, need to be clear, which is
supported by research on assessment. That one cannot evaluate progress
toward a goal that has not been clearly stated is self-evident. The gold
standard for objectives in evaluation research is that they be SMART—
specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound.18 Many of
the calls for clear strategy would be more than satisfied by SMART
strategic or operational objectives as well. Coupling the calls for leadership and strategy, leaders who are more attuned to thinking about the
information environment might also be more willing to specify goals in
a way that more clearly describes what they want to accomplish and how
informing, influencing, and persuading can contribute.
15     Christopher Paul, Whither Strategic Communication? A Survey of Current Proposals and
Recommendations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009).
16      Lindsey J. Borg, “Communicating with Intent: DoD and Strategic Communication” (graduate
studies report, Air University, April 2007), 23.
17     See, for example, the criticisms discussed in J. Boone Bartholomees, “Theory of Victory,”
Parameters 38, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 25–36; Richard Weitz, “The US Strategy ‘Deficit’: The Dominance
of Political Messaging,” Second Line of Defense: Delivering Capabilities to the Warfighter blog (March 2008),
http://www.sldinfo.com/the-u-s-strategy-%E2%80%9Cdeficit%E2%80%9D-the-dominance
-of-political-messaging/; Robert Haddick, “Why is Washington so Bad at Strategy?” Foreign Policy,
March 9, 2012; and Andy Zelleke and Justin Talbot Zorn, “United States: Where’s the Strategy?”
Diplomat, February 5, 2014.
18     For the origin of the criteria, see George T. Doran, “There’s a S.M.A.R.T. Way to Write
Management’s Goals and Objectives,” Management Review 70, no. 11 (1981): 35–36.
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Better Coordination

Second in prevalence to increased resources is an admonition
to coordinate better, also recommended in more than half of the
reviewed strategic communication and public diplomacy documents.
Many sources lament the lack of coordination of US government
efforts to inform, influence, and persuade, both within and between
agencies.19 Reports of “information fratricide,” where one element of the
government, including the military, makes a statement that contradicts
or undermines messages from elsewhere in the government, abound.20
Stepping beyond these calls for better coordination and integration
between agencies and departments in this area, efforts to integrate and
coordinate capabilities to inform, influence, and persuade with other
military capabilities as part of the combined arms construct should
continue. Information power should be viewed and treated as one of
the combat arms.
Taken together, the reports on strategic communication and public
diplomacy make clear that if informing, influencing, and persuading
are important, we need to continue to improve our abilities in these
areas. These top four recommendations and the challenges they imply
are particularly interesting; while the first clearly indicates a need for
increased resources the other three require commitment and change—
improvements that could be made with little or no additional expenditure,
a benefit in the increasingly austere fiscal climate.

Getting Better at Informing, Influencing, and Persuading

Informing, influencing, and persuading are critical to support and
achieve foreign policy goals. Such efforts are relatively cost effective, but
this capability area is underfunded and otherwise in need of improvement. Suggestions for getting better at informing, influencing, and
persuading in the current era of deepening budget cuts include:
Continuing to Expand Resource Allocations. Continue growing
public diplomacy, information operations, military information support
operations (MISO), and other information-related capabilities, as well
as our ability to prepare, coordinate, and integrate such efforts with
other forms of power.21 This action will require more resources in this
area for additional force structure, including personnel and formations
and staff billets in the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department
of State (DoS), as well as investment in specialized tools.22 As noted at
the beginning of this article, asking for more when everyone else is
tightening their belts is awkward, but the relatively low costs of such
efforts, their critical importance, and the possible savings make this the
right thing to do.
19     See, for example, A Smarter, More Secure America (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and
International Studies Commission on Smart Power, 2007); Defense Science Board, Task Force on
Strategic Communication; Kristin M. Lord, Voices of America: U.S. Public Diplomacy for the 21st Century,
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2008); and Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington,
DC: DoD, 2006).
20     Walter E. Richter, “The Future of Information Operations,” Military Review (January-February
2009), 103–13.
21     Military information support operations were formerly known as psychological operations.
22     Specific tool requirements evolve with changing technology, but some examples of their
usage include robust automated translation, monitoring social media, and visualizing the information
environment.

92

Parameters 46(3) Autumn 2016

Changing Culture to Create Communication Mindedness.
Changes to address perceived gaps in leadership, clarity of objectives,
and coordination must be made. Leaders and commanders need to
behave as if foreign publics and other populations’ perceptions affect the
US government’s ability to reach policy goals or operational objectives.
Further, leaders and commanders need to understand the things they
and their subordinates do and say shape and impact those perceptions
and have further echoes in and through the information environment.
Finally, individuals need to be thoughtful about and plan for the
messages and signals their actions and utterances send.
Summarized, this package of awareness and consideration is
“communication mindedness.”23 Significant progress toward leadership,
goals, and integration of information efforts with other policies and
operations could be made if all leaders and commanders possessed a
certain communication mindedness and were predisposed to ask or
think “what message does my planned course of action send” and
“what message do I want it to send?” If leaders begin to ask questions
about effects in and through the information environment, subordinates
will have to try to answer them. This accountability will lead to at least
three further positive developments: first, subordinates will ask these
questions earlier in the planning process to be able to answer their
leadership’s queries. Second, subordinates will begin to seek out
and consult with those who have relevant expertise in information
operations and information-related capabilities rather than such
specialists having to fight to try to somehow insert themselves into the
planning process (which happens far too often at the moment).24 Third,
the answers to these questions will inevitably align with broader goals
and lead to changes in operations or execution.
A bit of a culture change throughout the government and the DoD
is required to support leaders and commanders in developing communication mindedness—thinking and asking critical predicating questions.
The shift will take time, and it will take effort; fortunately, it will not
take much money.
Two suggestions for inculcating this culture change include training
and education programs and commanders modeling their expectations
by communicating an information end state. Costs might exist with
training and education or tradeoffs with existing curriculums may be
necessitated; however, the importance of, and information on, the means
to inform, influence, and persuade intentionally or otherwise should be
prominent in the training and education of junior, midtier, and senior
leaders. With sufficient exposure and acculturation, communication
mindedness and even more sophisticated awareness of and thinking
about these capabilities and processes can become fully integrated into
planning and decision-making.
This awareness is particularly critical in the DoD where information combat power should become just another arm of the
traditional combined arms approach as opposed to information
operations and information-related capabilities being considered a
23     Christopher Paul, Strategic Communication: Origins, Concepts, and Current Debates (Santa Barbara,
CA: Praeger, 2011), introduction.
24     See Helmus, Paul, and Glenn, Enlisting Madison Avenue, chap. 2.
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second-class citizen as a source of nonlethal effects, an afterthought
bolt-on to fires, or worse.25 Professional military education for even
junior officers should include introductory material on the possible
contributions of informing, influencing, and persuading. Training on
planning should explicitly include information operations as an important consideration for every operation. Training and education relevant
to the informational element of national power should become more
sophisticated throughout officers’ careers.
A process of culture change driven by training and education can
take years, perhaps even a generation. Thus, the second suggestion will
initiate the needed near-term culture change process as commanders ask
critical questions even when it is not natural to do so. Dennis Murphy,
a former US Army War College professor, has suggested all statements
of commander’s intent should also include a commander’s desired
information end state, and I have echoed this suggestion repeatedly.26
The inclusion of an information end state will force the commander
and planning staff to think about and be specific about desired
informational outcomes that will guide subordinate plans to comply
with the commander’s stated intent as well as provide more guidance
and context for subordinates’ autonomous decision-making in support
of the mission.
Here is an extended example of the benefits of operating under
such guidance. The traditional commander’s intent might include the
end state: “remove the insurgent threat from village X.” Subordinates
executing this guidance, depending on the existence of other standing
orders or rules of engagement, might conceivably have the whole military
toolbox open to them: they could level the village, cordon and search,
or apply a variety of softer approaches. Now imagine the implications
of additionally specifying the following information end state: “If possible, leave the population of village X neutral to US force presence.”
That intent significantly changes the approaches subordinates are likely
to take while also allowing the commander to assign explicit priorities
to physical versus informational or short-term versus long-term outcomes. The commander’s intent can also note rare occasions in which
informational end state does not matter. If commanders and their
planning staffs think about and explicitly communicate cognitive and
informational end states, their subordinates will have no choice but to
do so as well. Under this construction, the commander accepts responsibility for conceiving the information end state while his subordinates
naturally accept more responsibility for achieving it than they could have
if it were left unstated.
This recommendation is obviously aimed explicitly at the
Department of Defense, but also has applicability for senior leaders and
decision-makers throughout the government.
25     An example document conveying similar problems and proposing similar solutions is
Deployable Training Division, Integration of Lethal and Nonlethal Actions, 3rd ed., Insights and Best
Practices Focus Paper (Suffolk, VA: Joint Staff J7, 2016).
26     Dennis M. Murphy, Fighting Back: New Media and Military Operations (Carlisle Barracks,
PA: Center for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College, November 2008). Also see, Paul,
“Getting Better at Strategic Communication” (testimony, hearing on The Evolution of Strategic
Communication and Information Operations Since 9/11, Before the House Armed Services
Committee, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, July 12, 2011).
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Improving Department of State Capabilities. Accepting that
capabilities to inform, influence, and persuade are good and necessary, where should they be housed? The current distribution of such
capabilities is not necessarily ideal.27 Right now, “American public
diplomacy wears combat boots.”28 The Defense Department employs
the majority of the resources—funding, manpower, tools, and
programs—the US government uses to inform, influence, and persuade
foreign audiences. Most observers and participants in government communications agree that this is not the ideal state of affairs. Both the
White House and the Department of Defense concur; the Department
of State or another civilian agency should have a greater share of the
steady state US capabilities in this area.29 This shift would, of course,
require substantial changes at the State Department in terms of
orientation, priorities, funding, and capabilities available for public
diplomacy and strategic communication. This change also begs two
questions: what is the right balance between civilian and military
capabilities, and how do we get there?
Distributing informing, influencing, and persuading capabilities
exclusively to the Department of State or to the Department of Defense
is not an appropriate solution. Imagine that, in some foreseeable future,
State Department capabilities become sufficiently robust to meet a
baseline of steady-state needs on a global level. The Defense Department
will still need to retain significant capability in this area for several
reasons. One is that actions communicate. Defense personnel will
continue to act and need the capabilities to support planning and
coordinating the communication content of those actions. Defense
agencies and military formations will also need at least the minimum
communication capabilities to explain those actions and encourage
favorable perceptions of those actions.
Also, Defense responsibilities for contingency response necessitate
retaining capabilities to inform, influence, and persuade. Even the most
robust State Department imaginable will lack the kind of surge capacity and expeditionary capability needed to respond to the crises and
contingencies for which our military prepares. When the US military
presence in a foreign country expands from negligible to massive, who
will be alongside the operating forces, explaining and making their presence palatable? The answer is military communicators. If all the military
communicators went away, no one would conduct critical inform, influence, and persuade missions at the outset of an emergent crisis, which
is why the DoD needs to remain capable. In fact, Defense personnel,
as argued above, should continue to become more capable, given the
possible savings for other defense capabilities.
Further, military leaders should be encouraged to use informational
combat power as part of their combined arms approach to prevail over
our nation’s foes, rather than outsourcing the capability to other parts
of the government.
27     Paul, Origins, Concepts, and Current Debates.
28     Matthew Armstrong, “Operationalizing Public Diplomacy,” in Routledge Handbook of Public
Diplomacy, ed. Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor (New York: Routledge, 2009), 63.
29     White House, Framework for Strategic Communication; and Patricia H. Kushlis and Patricia Lee
Sharpe, “Public Diplomacy Matters More Than Ever,” Foreign Service Journal 83, no. 10 (October
2006): 32.
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The existing structure and organization at DoS limits its absorptive
capacity for quickly building new or assuming existing responsibilities
for informing, influencing, and persuading. Considerably smaller than
DoD, State personnel allocations are also less flexible. Culturally, the
State Department views its primary mission as traditional state-to-state
diplomacy, not public diplomacy, and the public diplomacy apparatus
is currently quite small.30 To become the home for government capabilities in this area, DoS will need to pursue organizational and cultural
changes and increase or transfer resource allocations in moderate,
absorbable amounts.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Even though the government needs to increase resources and expand
capabilities for informing, influencing, and persuading, the following
three suggestions support using existing resources and capabilities more
wisely and efficiently.

Emphasizing Assessment and Evaluation

Too often, efforts to inform, influence, or persuade go unmeasured.
The failure to establish clear evaluation criteria limits planners from
determining the extent to which their efforts have been successful.
Likewise, analysts may observe an effort’s effectiveness, but have no
way to explain the outcome. Quality assessments can improve planning,
shape midcourse corrections, and improve accountability and oversight.
While costs are associated with assessments, the benefits make them
worthwhile. Good assessments can improve the prospects for a nascent
effort, save a failing effort, and demonstrate the cost-effectiveness of
successful efforts.31

MISO for Everyone

Currently, all active duty Army Military Information Support
Operations (MISO) personnel are tasked with supporting US Special
Operations Command, leaving general purpose forces supported by
reserve formations. This broad tasking, along with high clearance levels
and operational environments, leaves MISO forces detached from line
units, which results in tasks to produce influence products independently
or provide close tactical support to special operators. Efforts organized
in this way have produced valuable effects, especially at the tactical level;
however, the need for effective informing, influencing, and persuading
is bigger than that.
Actions speak louder than words. Maneuver and line forces far
outnumber MISO forces and are the preponderant face of US forces
to the populations in areas of operations worldwide. The words and
deeds of these forces do contribute to influence, which is best if the
30     One of the smallest State Department career tracks, or “cones” in State parlance, public
diplomacy officers are only about 1,000 of approximately 11,000 foreign service officers. See
Laurence Wohlers, Getting The People Part Right: A Report on the Human Resources Dimension of U.S. Public
Diplomacy, with Katherine Brown and Chris Hensman (Washington, DC: Meridian International
Center / US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 2008), 8.
31     For industry, academia, and government best practices that are applicable to DoD assessments, see Christopher Paul, Jessica Yeats, Colin P. Clarke, Miriam Matthews, and Lauren Skrabala,
Assessing and Evaluating Department of Defense Efforts to Inform, Influence, and Persuade: Handbook for
Practitioners (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015).
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contribution is thoughtful and positive. How can the actions of our
line forces contribute better and more consistently in this area? Greater
command emphasis on influence and communication mindedness will
help, but even when trying to make a positive contribution in this arena,
most military personnel simply lack the expertise. One solution is more
military information support operations force structure, but if these
forces reduced the amount of time spent making influence products
and increased the time spent training, preparing, and supporting the
inform and influence activities of the rest of the force, thoughts about
and employment of their capabilities would change. Instead of being
exclusive, information operations could become inclusive.
Perhaps a model worth considering is the relationship between
civil affairs (CA) forces and civil-military operations.32 Like MISO,
civil affairs is a discrete military organization within the service with
its own personnel and force structure. As all other force elements at the
commander’s discretion, civil affairs units integrate with and support
civil-military operations efforts, however, much more frequently than
do their line unit colleagues. Civil affairs units engage in independent
activities, but they also help plan and enable the efforts of other forces.
MISO forces are the only personnel in the US government who are
trained to conduct influence. What if we make the relationship of
MISO to the (intentional or otherwise) influence efforts of maneuver
units similar to the relationship between civil affairs and civil-military
operations? Using military information support operation forces to
directly support and enable the influence efforts of maneuver forces
would reduce the number of products they would have time to produce,
but the trade-offs are worth considering.

Cyberspace and Informing, Influencing, and Persuading

Capabilities to defend and operate in cyberspace are of critical
importance now and in the foreseeable future. The American need
to improve in that area is broadly accepted; however, nascent and
existing cyber-related organizations and capabilities are extremely
well-resourced. In fact, cybercapabilities are currently suspected to be
over-resourced in relation to the absorptive capacity of organizations
and commands responsible for this area. Although cyberthreats are
growing, may require serious investment, and are rightly supported with
vigorous funding, at the moment authorities unfortunately lag proper
capabilities and lexical agreements. Additionally, command and control
disputes delay implementation and maturation of cybercapabilities.33
Some cyber-resources could and should be slowed or diverted to related
information capabilities.
Particularly relevant, a possible relationship between cyber‑
operations and information operations could give rise to cyberenabled
32     Civil-military operations are defined as “activities of a commander performed by designated
civil affairs or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between
military forces, indigenous populations, and institutions, by directly supporting the attainment
of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host
nation.” See US Joint Chiefs of Staff, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication
1-02 (Washington, DC: DoD, February 15, 2016).
33     For criticism related to limiting authorities and bureaucracy, see Sydney J. Freedburg Jr.,
“Thornberry Fears Bureaucracy Hamstrings Cyber vs. Daesh,” Breaking Defense, June 22, 2016,
http://breakingdefense.com/2016/06/thornberry-fears-bureaucracy-hamstrings-cyber-vs-isis/.
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MISO, which would fill an important operational seam. As an example,
cyberforces can potentially access and exploit adversary networks and
systems, to include electronic communications—e-mail, for example—
however, just because offensive cyberoperations or computer network
exploitation experts might be able to send messages to adversaries or
potential adversaries, cyberexperts are not necessarily expert in the
composition of effective personal influence messages. That expertise
lies elsewhere—namely in military information support operations.
When tasked with a mission that includes an exploitation like this, a
lash-up might occur if cyberforces contact and leverage MISO expertise,
preferably at some point prior to the exact moment the adversary network
has been penetrated and operators are poised, ready to type an influential
message. Importantly, it is possible that cyberpersonnel would execute
the mission without leveraging external expertise, mistaking their own
expertise at creating the opportunity to send the message as sufficient
for designing the content of the message, too.
Standing relationships between cyber formations or commands
and military information support operation formations for efforts like
or related to the one discussed above would not be unreasonable for
executing cyberenabled MISO. The details of the variety of ways this
relationship could be structured are not important here. That such
relationships be considered and that the necessary capabilities be
developed or constructed from existing ones is important. Even more
important in this context, funds dedicated to the cybermission area can
and should be used to support these improvements to both cyber and
inform, influence, and persuade capabilities.

